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Discourse and the Master’s Lining: A Lacanian Critique of the Globalising (Bio)Politics 
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
 
Colin Wright, The University of Nottingham 
 
 
If a single concept could claim to underlie the diverse innovations in post-Marxism, 
postcolonialism, critical race studies, feminism, queer theory and gender studies over the last 
thirty years, it would surely be Michel Foucault’s notion of ‘discourse’, understood as the 
productive commingling of power and knowledge? And yet, relatively few have seen that 
Jacques Lacan’s work offers arguably even richer resources for a theory of the interweavings 
of discourse, power and knowledge. Well before Foucault’s work made such an impact, Lacan 
had been developing a nuanced theory of discourse that drew on Saussurean linguistics, game 
theory and cybernetics, as well as Freudian psychoanalysis. It was to discourse, too, that Lacan 
returned in a novel way in Seminar XVII as a response to the radicalism of May ’68 (Lacan 
2007). However, what Lacan meant by discourse was never what Foucault meant. 
 
In what follows, I want to outline what is specific about Lacan’s psychoanalytic rather than 
sociolinguistic concept of discourse; what separates it from but also allows it to usefully 
supplement Foucault’s; and what it contributes to the key problematic within all truly political 
theories of discourse: the role of the subject in the dialectic between structure and agency (a 
question dramatically posed by May ’68). My overall claims are that: if we follow Seminar 
XVII closely, the relationship between psychoanalysis and politics can be seen to be irrevocably 
linked to its clinical practice; that this link to the clinic is what prevents the co-opting of 
psychoanalytic theory by ‘university discourse’; and that the clinical link also focuses Lacanian 
political theory on the contemporary discourse of health, something Foucault himself 
recognized as the ‘biopolitical’ core of neoliberalism (Foucault 2010).  
 
To outline the implications of this juxtaposition of a Foucaultian and a Lacanian approach, I 
will undertake a brief critique of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM), the textbook which governs the application of psychiatric theory and practice in many 
parts of the world. Following this example, I will then reflect more generally on what the 
Lacanian theory of discourse offers to the critique of capitalism. 
 
Political Discourse Theory in the Academy 
 
May ’68 was arguably a fork in the path for the concept of discourse. As we shall see, it 
prompted Lacan to reinvent his understanding of discourse. But it was also the moment when 
a broadly Foucaultian notion of discourse took off in the academy.  
 
Foucault’s first major publication, Madness and Civilization (1961), had referred to madness 
as an historically variable ‘discourse’ rather than an ontological invariant, and was received 
largely as a structuralist intervention into the history of ideas. This was also the case with The 
Order of Things (1966) which studied the changing discursive conditions of the disciplines of 
linguistics, biology and political economy, in order to outline an archeology of the sciences of 
Man. Foucault was then seen to be at the centre of structuralist anti-humanism alongside Louis 
Althusser and, indeed, Lacan himself - though Foucault came to dispute this characterization 
of his work (Foucault 1980, 114). And yet the Foucaultian concept of discourse really rose to 
prominence as part of the critique of structuralism, initiated by Jacques Derrida in 1967, but in 
full swing after May 68.  
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Althusser’s structuralist Marxism had seemed bereft before the novelty of the May movement, 
and his stubborn adherence to the Parti Communiste Française (PCF) condemned him in the 
eyes of many (Ross 2002). The refreshing combination of Maoist and also Situationist ideas 
during May ‘68 (Feenberg and Freedman 2001) paved the way for the replacement of 
Althusser’s structuralist concept of ‘ideology’ - which only an intellectual vanguard of Marxist 
‘scientists’ could supposedly identify - by the Foucaultian concept of ‘discourse’ - which was 
already equipped to critique the social construction of scientific truth-claims, including Marxist 
ones. Jacques Rancière’s very public break with Althusser was based on exactly this issue of 
the veiled violence of supposedly scientific knowledge. For Rancière, any institutionalized, 
‘objective’ knowledge, whether validated by a university system or a political party, endorses 
a hierarchical distribution of intellects and roles, so that Althusser’s version of ideology critique 
was actually a ‘return to order’ (Rancière 2011 xv). The term ‘discourse’ then, maintained the 
links between power and contestation but it also ameliorated the reduction of agency to 
sociological definitions of class on which the supposed ‘scientific’ legitimacy of Althusser and 
the PCF rested. Though Foucault himself was considerably more nuanced - The Archeology of 
Knowledge, for example, is clear that discourse is fragile in its very imposition (Foucault 2003) 
– the dominant understanding of discourse to emerge from this moment was a version of ‘social 
constructionism’ that would later feed into the so-called Science Wars and postmodernism. 
 
Nor was this an exclusively French affair. For British Cultural Studies, particularly under the 
influence of the late Stuart Hall, a turn to discourse in the 1970s was part of a related shift to 
the so-called New Social Movements, and thus to a broad-based identity politics. Hall himself 
combined semiotic approaches to ‘encoding/decoding’ with a Gramscian understanding of a 
hegemonic cultural politics (Hall 1973). Paradoxically, it was also at this time that Lacan’s 
work began to be taken up in Anglophone academia precisely as a ‘discourse theory’ that could 
explain the mechanisms of ideology. This is very clear in the psychoanalytic film theory of the 
Screen Studies group, most famously exemplified by Laura Mulvey’s notion of the ‘male gaze’ 
(Mulvey 1975). Picking up on Althusser’s own use of it in the ‘Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses’ essay (Althusser 1971), these semiotic critics of film, advertising and mass visual 
culture used Lacan’s early paper on the ‘mirror-stage’ (Lacan 2006a) to explore the 
construction of sexed, gendered and raced ‘subjects’ in capitalist society.  
 
But already, something crucial had been lost in this turn to a constructionist understanding of 
discourse: the sexed/gendered/raced subject of Anglo-Saxon Cultural Studies had ceased to be 
a recognizably psychoanalytic subject in the Lacanian sense. The fundamental point about 
Lacan’s mirror stage argument is that the foundation of the illusory ego lies not simply in the 
reflective surface of the imaginary, but also in the validating function of a symbolic Other: it 
is the (m)Other that confirms the infant’s imago. The elementary psychoanalytic consequence 
of this is that the egoic individual who (mis)recognizes himself in the mirror never coincides 
with or exhausts the topologically distinct subject of the unconscious because his being, as it 
were, comes from the Other. Lacan was always diametrically opposed to the idea that power 
positively produces ‘subjects’ without remainder, whether via Althusserian interpellation or 
Foucaultian discourse. For him, the very fact of speaking introduces an excess or left-over 
because the speaker has a real body of drives which cannot be symbolized in speech. Once 
speech is assumed, desire becomes possible but as what persists (and insists) in the lack 
produced when need is subtracted from demand (Lacan 2006b). The infant, for example, might 
seem to demand the breast to satisfy his need for nourishment, but more fundamentally he 
desires, insatiably, the love of the Other. Lacan’s related opposition between the ‘subject of the 
signifier’ and the ‘subject of the signified’ (see Lacan 2006c, 430) demonstrated that while 
 3 
discourse, understood as a Foucaultian truth-regime, can indeed produce subjects as objects of 
statements, the Lacanian subject evades any such reduction because of its excessive character. 
To take the simplest example, when in English we invoke the personal pronoun ‘I’ to try to 
convey what is most intimate to our sense of self, it is obvious that we rely on a mere signifier 
that everyone speaking English also leans on for the same paradoxical purpose. In any 
statement with the structure ‘I am x’, there is a referent at the level of propositional content and 
this is the ‘subject of the signified’ which attempts to fix a meaning. But there is also the 
excessive moment of enunciation itself, which Lacan calls ‘the subject of the signifier’, and 
which makes its presence felt not as but in speech, often as a break in meaning (the famous 
‘Freudian slip’ for example). Moreover, as the difficult concept of the real comes to the fore in 
Lacan’s later teaching, the subject is more and more indexed to a radically singular mode of 
enjoyment outside symbolic law, though not outside language in its meaningless materiality. 
Reading very early Lacan through a Foucaultian notion of discourse, as many in Anglophone 
academia did, evacuated this all-important distinction between the imaginary individual, with 
an apparent identity amenable to ‘construction’, and the real subject of the unconscious which 
is not a ‘social construction’ but a singular creation or invention which makes use of the 
common discourse. Conceptualizing the subject as nothing other than its hailing by power is 
absolutely incompatible with any psychoanalytic understanding of the subject, even on the 
most orthodox, biologistic reading of Freud in which ‘instinct’ exceeds and undermines the 
demands of social repression.  
 
Nonetheless, it was from British Cultural Studies that the most overtly ‘Lacanian’ political 
discourse theory emerged in the mid-1980s. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy (1985) brought Gramsci and Lacan together in an anti-essentialist post-
Marxism that put ‘discourse’ at the centre of political change. However, the version of Lacan 
they appealed to was dry and formalistic and entirely divorced from clinical practice. They 
took from early Lacan two key concepts: the ‘empty signifier’, and ‘points de capiton’ or 
‘quilting points’. The ‘empty signifier’, they argued, operates like a master signifier ordering 
the relations between the other elements in a symbolic system, but only because it is 
ontologically empty. They had in mind the kind of abstract nouns that do indeed organize much 
ostensibly political debate, such as ‘freedom’, ‘nation’ and ‘democracy’. Lacan’s other notion 
of points de capiton was then used to refer to the always provisional ‘quilting’ of the social 
text(ile), stabilizing a semiotic flux by means of certain privileged signifiers. They interpreted 
this ‘quilting’ as a hegemonic filling of these empty signifiers in order to create ‘chains of 
equivalence’ encompassing more and more actors in the discursive social space. Official 
representational politics, they contended, colonizes these empty signifiers in ways that preserve 
a particular group’s vested interests behind the rhetoric of universalism. Yet they also held out 
a hope for a radical form of democracy that exploits this universalism in order to extend 
equivalence to minority groups. Yannis Stavrakakis (1999) has highlighted precisely what was 
Lacanian in particularly Laclau’s political discourse theory, while Slavoj Žižek (Butler et al 
2000) has pointed out the ways in which it has never been Lacanian enough. Nonetheless, 
Laclau and Mouffe’s nominally ‘Lacanian’ discourse theory did spawn an approach to ‘texts’, 
influential in Media and Cultural Studies, called Critical Discourse Analysis (Wodak and 
Meyer, 2009). Thanks to the dominance of the hard sciences, there is some debate about 
whether this can be considered a methodology at all, but it is certainly taught as if it were one.  
 
From the point of view of psychoanalytic clinical practice, it is clear that many crucial concepts 
are lost in this translation of Lacanian ideas into social and political theory, and into 
transmissible methodologies serviceable to academic knowledge-production. What becomes, 
for example, of the unconscious itself, as an enjoying knowledge that does not know itself 
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(Lacan 1999)? Laclau and Mouffe effectively claim to master the unconscious as a structure of 
lack whose effects can be formalized, predicted, and even mobilised as part of a political 
programme of increased inclusivity. In all rigour, this cannot be found in Lacan. For related 
reasons, academic discourse analysis seems to reduce speech to two modes: either the speech 
of the Big Other imposing hegemonic power, or an attempt by the subject to make their voice 
heard by addressing to that Other a demand for recognition. Clinically speaking, this reduces 
speech to its self-reinforcing imaginary dimension. In analytic practice, Freud’s ‘fundamental 
rule’ of free association aims to enable the speaker to hear the Other already in their own 
speech. Certainly with neurotics, analysis moves in exactly the opposite direction of any 
‘politics of identity’, even one based on a structural lack assumed to be democratically 
empowering. One of Lacan’s most succinct definitions of the aim of analysis is the attainment 
of “absolute difference” (Lacan 1998a, 276), meaning the singularity of the analysand’s mode 
of enjoyment as radically distinct from wider social norms. Such absolute difference is 
incompatible with the ‘multicultural’ or ‘rainbow’ version of difference dreamed of by the 
liberal pluralism that Laclau and Mouffe’s approach comes dangerously close to resembling.  
 
I would suggest that this tendency to remain at the level of the imaginary stems from a 
problematic conflation of speech and discourse within academic discourse analysis. This is due 
probably to the discipline’s origins in conversation analysis and sociolinguistics, where 
discourse is indeed conceptualized primarily as ‘talk’, as well as its recourse to a constructionist 
reading of Foucault. From a Lacanian point of view however, the structural gap between 
discourse and speech is a prerequisite for any notion of the unconscious, and thus for any 
topology of the relationship between subjectivity and the ‘social link’. One of the underlying 
problems in all of this work therefore, is a deeply non-psychoanalytic conception of the link 
between psychoanalysis and politics, in which the former becomes a theory appropriable by 
the latter. However, by turning now to Seminar XVII (also a response to May ’68), we can 
explore Lacan’s psychoanalytic understanding of ‘discourse’ and, in the process, reconfigure 
the psychoanalysis-politics relation by foregrounding clinical practice. 
 
A Closer Look At The Other Side 
 
The Other Side of Psychoanalysis is one of the most startling innovations in Lacan’s teaching. 
Loosely, it can be situated as an auto-critique of aspects of Seminar VII on ethics, as a 
continuation of the concern with the foundations of psychoanalysis in Seminar XI, and as 
paving the way for the renewed focus on knowledge in Seminar XX. Most famously however, 
it is where he chooses to formalize the ‘four discourses’: the discourse of the Master, the 
Hysteric, Analysis itself, and the University. I am going to say less about each of these 
individually, and more about what they reveal regarding Lacan’s approach to discourse in 
general, since from the outset it was productively different from Foucault’s. 
 
The profound consistency in the way Lacan uses the term ‘discourse’ was already evident in 
his interpretation of three key theoretical resources during the 1950s: Saussurean linguistics, 
Lévi-Strauss’ concept of myth, and cybernetics and information theory.  
 
Firstly, from Saussurean linguistics Lacan takes the distinction between parole as speech, and 
langue as the underlying system of differences invoked in every speech-act. Langue, then, 
would be the linguistic unconscious into which we are constitutively thrown by dint of our pre-
natal induction into a particular speech community. Crucially however, one can never point at 
or circumscribe langue: even in Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics, langue represents a 
limit to positivist knowledge, linking it, in Lacan’s view, to the unconscious. Whenever Lacan 
 5 
speaks of ‘discourse’ then - as in the famous aphorism ‘the unconscious is the discourse of the 
Other’ - he is invoking the Saussurean point that langue only exists in the social conventions 
of speakers. Discourse is thus an intrinsically social bond not only because it involves, 
minimally, two subjects, but also because it distributes relations between them prior to any 
particular act of speech: for there to be speakers, this distribution must already have taken place. 
Even when one speaks to oneself, the symbolic Other is present. To express this using one of 
Saussure’s favoured examples, if it is possible to play oneself at chess, the rules of chess must 
be in place as a ‘third’ that facilitates the turn-taking of the ‘two’ which, in purely chess terms, 
are indeed at play even in this scenario.  
 
Secondly, this emphasis on discourse as a chess-like combinatory is explored further through 
Lacan’s reading of structuralist anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (1969). In his approach to 
myth, Lévi-Strauss argued that the diverse cosmologies invented by different cultures around 
the world are effectively imaginary treatments of underlying symbolic systems. What Lévi-
Strauss contributes over and above Saussure, however, is the additional idea that myths are 
responses to fundamental logical contradictions which cannot be resolved: again, we see a 
constitutive relation to impossibility that gets mythic systems underway, as reaction formations 
to what Lacan would call the real. For example, Lévi-Strauss shows that the elaboration of 
Oedipal themes in many cultures reflects a ‘treatment’ of the incest taboo regulating 
exogamous kinship structures (Lévi-Strauss 1969). By such means, a contradiction which can 
be formally expressed ‘X:Y’ is, not resolved, but sublated by myth into a narrative form that 
re-presents that contradiction at another level, as ‘Y:X’. Mythic speech is thus secondary to a 
preceding symbolic discourse. 
 
Thirdly, Lacan further separates discourse from speech with reference to developments in 
cybernetics and information theory. Taking his lead this time from Roman Jackobson who was 
tangentially involved in the famous Macy conferences on cybernetics, Lacan parses a 
distinction between ‘message’ and ‘code’ (Lacan 1998b). Any meaningful message, he 
recognized, is but the epiphenomenal result of an underlying logical system of encoding which 
is absolutely without meaning. In this sense, if a discourse can be said to be ‘common’ (16) it 
is only by ‘saying’ absolutely nothing (just as, in our digital era, the fact that binary code means 
nothing whatsoever is the very quality fuelling the information revolution). Lacan’s early 
challenge to psychological theories of communication predicated on intention therefore 
paralleled developments in information theory at this time, thanks to which messages were 
being re-conceptualized as patterned randomness or organised ‘noise’. For Lacan, there is 
always a failure in the imagined circularity of human communication, and it is precisely this 
that discourse explains. 
 
One can see these traits of discourse coming to the fore in a new way in Seminar XVII where 
Lacan declares that “discourse can clearly consist without words” (Lacan 2007, 13) but that 
“[t]he deployment of speech […] has been confused with what discourse is” (167). Was this 
critique already directed at a simplistic conception of Foucaultian discourse? Echoing Lévi-
Strauss, Lacan also clarifies that discourse is structured around something opaque and 
irresolvable. Early on in the seminar, this relates particularly to the S1 as a unary trait which 
intervenes into the “battery of signifiers”, written S2, in order to construct a coherent field of 
knowledge, but one which is henceforth marked by this initial meaningless inscription (13). As 
the seminar unfolds, it becomes clearer that this opacity at the kernel of all discourse is 
ultimately the real of jouissance (in relation to which the unary trait is already a treatment, a 
regulation via the repetition of the signifier). Discourse of any kind is therefore an attempt to 
order the disordered real.  
 6 
 
Here we could contrast Lacan’s assertion that “the impossible is the real” (165) with the famous 
Situationist slogan circulating around the same time: ‘Be realistic, demand the impossible!’. 
Though the latter invokes a critique of dominant conceptions of both ‘reality’ and what is 
possible within it, Lacan’s intervention implies that every demand is already indirectly 
addressed to an impossibility, but one that, as real, can never be granted by the Master still 
implied within the Situationist slogan (for to whom but a Master could such a rebellious 
demand be addressed?). This is where the stakes of the distinction between speech as talk, and 
discourse as structure, become apparent. Although Lacan acknowledged that, historically, the 
Hysteric’s critique of the Master has led to displacements of discourse (94), he also recognized, 
in the wake of May ’68, that no amount of breathless pseudo-Maoist chatter at the level of 
speech could in itself produce change at the level of the real of discourse. It was the old 
astronomical notion of ‘revolution’, as a heavenly rotation returning to its starting point, that 
Lacan had in mind when he said to one of the radicalized soixante-huitards: “What you aspire 
to as revolutionaries is a new master. You will get one” (207). 
 
It would be a major mistake, however, to conclude that Lacan was a conservative reactionary. 
As a psychoanalyst, he was necessarily committed to the notion of change. But also as a 
psychoanalyst, he was committed to the specificity of that change within a mode of discourse 
like no other: psychoanalysis itself as a clinical practice. Defining psychoanalysis as a 
discourse and thus a social bond between analyst and analysand, and not as a mode of technical 
talk reserved for expert initiates, indicates that just because the phrase ‘the unconscious’ is 
being used, it by no means follows that the unconscious is at work. Indeed, the reverse would 
be a safer bet. Such a distinction was already at play in Lacan’s critique of the ‘other 
psychoanalysis’ of ego psychology and Kleinian object relations. But Seminar XVII goes 
further by formalising the structure of analytic discourse itself, as a response, I would argue, to 
the risk that psychoanalysis would be pulled into the vortex of the various ‘philosophies of 
desire’ then fuelling aspects of May ’68. Is this not a genuine danger the moment 
psychoanalytic knowledge is abstracted from clinical practice where its discourse is operative? 
Psychoanalytic talk is cheap, but a discourse that can sustain transferential effects is rare and 
precious. 
 
One particularly widespread understanding of the relationship between psychoanalysis and 
politics is what I would call the politicization of libido. By this I mean that seductive fantasy 
of the violent return of repressed sexual instinct against the forces of social control broadly 
shared by thinkers coming out of the Frankfurt School’s Freudo-Marxist tradition, such as 
Wilhelm Reich, Herbert Marcuse and, later, Deleuze and Guattari (to whose Anti-Oedipus, of 
course, Foucault wrote such an affirmative preface). Significantly, many in this Freudo-Marxist 
tradition, Theodor Adorno most notably, viewed clinical psychoanalysis negatively as a 
disciplinary mechanism for imposing bourgeois norms, despite seeing great revolutionary 
value in psychoanalytic theory and its account of libido. Lacan would agree that libido – or, in 
his terms, jouissance - is political, but not in this vitalist sense. Despite appearances then, the 
assertion in Seminar XVII that “the only discourse there is, and not just analytic discourse, is 
the discourse of jouissance” (78), represents a crucial shift away from this naïve politicization 
of libido which coincides (but hardly coincidentally) with a downplaying of the clinic. 
 
Ten years earlier in Seminar VII, Lacan had argued that the symbolic and jouissance are 
fundamentally opposed, though he presented transgression, via the figure of the Marquis de 
Sade, as a roundabout way of attaining it from the dialectic between law and desire (Lacan 
1997). But here in Seminar XVII, he shows that the symbolic and jouissance have merged under 
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capitalism. He does so by developing a theory of ‘surplus jouissance’ which draws on, but also 
adds to, Marx’s notion of surplus value. His key insight is that far from inaugurating a loss of 
enjoyment through alienation from one’s ‘species being’ - as the early Marx of the 1844 
Manuscripts argued - with labour’s transformation into a commodity, work in fact becomes 
enjoyment itself, rendering loss and surplus two sides of the very same coin. As Lacan puts it, 
“the important point is that on a certain day surplus jouissance became calculable, could be 
counted, totalized” (Lacan 2007, 177). The Master suddenly takes an interest in counting, in 
knowledge itself as a means of accumulation. The feudal lord, blissfully happy in his ignorance 
of practical life so long as his serfs took care of all that, is replaced by the bookkeeper, the 
bureaucrat, the statistician, and today perhaps the performance reviewer. This culminates in 
what Lacan calls, not without calculated irony, the ‘university discourse’, in which knowledge 
comes to occupy the place of mastery. By Seminar XVII then, knowledge becomes not the 
mortifying enemy of jouissance, but the “sister of jouissance” (67), i.e., the vehicle of its 
production and transmission, its blood-relation. 
 
This new simultaneity of knowledge and jouissance, and the related understanding of all 
discourses as apparatuses of jouissance, means that we are no longer dealing with a simplistic 
model of libidinal repression as the psychosocial core of civilization. Repression persists, but 
it is not of affect as some kind of substance or élan vital: it is of and through signifiers (144). 
Lacan takes us beyond the tradition in political philosophy of ‘social contract theory’. For with 
figures like Hobbes, Rousseau, and indeed a certain Marx, do we not see a consistent recourse 
to problematic figures of what might be called ‘enjoying nature’, whether sublated in a 
sovereign Leviathan (Hobbes), corrupted by the absence of a general will (Rousseau), or 
quashed by the division of labour (Marx)? And in each case, can it not be said that these images 
of enjoying nature play a part in presenting the structural fact of the impossibility of the real as 
if it were merely a contingent loss, getting a whole massive effort of recuperation underway? 
Nor does Lacan spare Freud from this kind of critique: a third of Seminar XVII is taken up with 
a discussion of Freud’s Oedipal “dream” (117) about the ‘father of the primal horde’ in Moses 
and Monotheism, which similarly situates loss in a primordial past, and projects backwards the 
fantasy of an uncastrated man who can enjoy all women.  
 
A quite different topology of the ‘other side’ becomes discernible with this reading of discourse 
as an apparatus of, rather than against, jouissance. Analytic discourse is very precisely the 
‘other side’ of the Master’s discourse in that the former results from a 90◦ counter-clockwise 
rotation of the latter’s matheme. Certainly, Lacan believes there is something subversive in this 
turn. But his title also parodies metaphysical notions of the ‘other side’ characteristic of what 
I have called the ‘politicization of libido’. The topology he has in mind is much closer to a 
moebius strip in which psychoanalysis is the ‘other side’ of the Master’s discourse only as a 
twist in the very same discourse. Seminar XVII suspends all simplistic notions of a pure before 
or beyond or outside of discourse, and yet also of total discursive determination on the 
‘constructionist’ model. In the fourth session, Lacan gives us another way of thinking of the 
psychoanalysis-politics relation:  
 
But the fact that the analytic discourse completes the 90◦ displacement by which the three 
others are structured does not mean that it resolves them and enables one to pass to the 
other side. It doesn’t resolve anything. The inside does not explain the outside (Lacan 2007, 
54) 
 
Here, Russell Grigg provides a useful translator’s note that reminds us that l’envers can also 
mean ‘the lining’ “as in the lining of a jacket” (54). Is this not an excellent figure for the kind 
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of topological twist Lacan is describing? A lining offers a surface that follows the innermost 
contours of a jacket tailor-made to embody the Master (in the midst of May ’68 we can perhaps 
think of the uniform of les Flics, the academic’s no-doubt corduroy jacket, or today the business 
suit). Nevertheless, such a lining also introduces folds, slippages, little wrinkles of excess that 
help the jacket sit on the body it borrows as a framework, but can lead to uncomfortable 
furrows. These furrows also relate to knowledge, for precisely as a lining of the Master’s 
discourse, analytic discourse is too internal to provide a transcendental (masterful) knowledge 
of the whole. Far from being a mode of ignorance however, this awareness of the lack in the 
Other is the positive form of psychoanalytic knowledge. For a long time, Lacan had been saying 
‘there is no such thing as a meta-language’ or, differently put, that ‘there is no Other of the 
Other’. This is at once an ethical and a logical proposition. It is logical to the extent that, as 
Bertrand Russell pointed out to Frege, there cannot be a set of all sets that do not belong to 
themselves, a structural fact that Gödel articulated for the field of mathematics. For 
psychoanalysis, however, that there is no Other of the Other is also an ethical proposition 
insofar as it bars a global knowledge of the unconscious that would somehow be outside of, or 
uncontaminated by, the unconscious itself, a pure knowledge free from the effects of the 
signifier or of jouissance. An analyst, for example, who both listens and interprets from such 
an imaginary position of ideal or transcendent knowledge is entirely deaf to the unconscious, 
and his interventions will inevitably close it down. In a culture that sustains dreams of masterful 
metalanguages, such as the Human Genome Project as the overarching ‘Book of Life’, this 
insistence on a lack, limit or lacunae in knowledge, goes very much against the positivist grain. 
Lacan’s invocation of the lining here, however, suggests that unconscious knowledge will 
always exist in the intimate folds of the Master’s discourse which needs its lining to clothe the 
body-politic. 
 
But to repeat, this knowledge emerges from analytic discourse itself. It is not disseminated by 
institutional power, which is why Lacan gave such careful thought to the structure of the 
psychoanalytic school (see Section V of Lacan 2001). As a critical and cultural theory, 
psychoanalysis certainly has an important place in the academy. But as a practice, it is 
inseparable from a discourse in which masterful knowledge is only an initial supposition that 
must ultimately be discarded: this is the famous ‘subject supposed to know’ which, at least in 
the case of the symbolic transference of neurotics, instantiates in analysis an Other deemed to 
have the answer to one’s existential questions. But crucially, such a subject supposed to know 
is precisely a supposition internal to the transferential address, and not an ontological fact: like 
Socrates, the analyst is only wise to the extent that he knows he knows nothing. The subject 
supposed to know is thus what Lacan calls a semblant, an appearance that, although essential 
early on, is destined to fall away. In this sense, though the matheme of the analyst’s discourse 
in Seminar XVII places the cause of desire in the position of agency, it would be a category 
error to promote analytic discourse to a ‘science of desire’ because the kind of knowledge it 
produces is not of the scientific kind. The link between psychoanalysis and politics rests, rather, 
on a claim to being the only discourse capable of showing the desire - or better, the jouissance 
- at work in the others, particularly university discourse and its reification of, precisely, science.  
 
The Biopolitics of the DSM   
 
One would be hard-pushed to find a better example of university discourse than the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Health Disorders (DSM). Yet, as a nodal point linking an 
ensemble of deterritorialized institutions, it is also a quintessential example of Foucaultian 
discourse operating at the nexus of power and knowledge (see Rose 1998; 2006). Globalization 
of any kind obviously profits from standardization, whether English as the ‘language of 
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business’ or of GDP as the ‘universal’ measure of good governance: the globalization of mental 
health is no different, and the DSM is its primary instrument.  
 
Clinical psychiatrists, psychologists, counsellors and even social workers around the world 
now use the DSM as a standard diagnostic assessment tool, shaping hospital admissions, care 
‘pathways’, and regimes of pill-based treatments. Academics within and without the ‘psy’ 
fields use the DSM’s categories to organise their empirical research and interpret their findings. 
The multi-billion dollar global pharmaceutical industry tailors its research and development to 
the DSM’s latest classifications. That industry also has a very substantial role in the formation 
of those classifications in the first place: members of the DSM committees have been forced to 
declare very significant ties to ‘Big Pharma’, from holding shares, to serving as paid 
researchers, to endorsing the most recent off-the-shelf anti-depressant or anti-psychotic drugs. 
These same companies undertake aggressive marketing campaigns in order to shift cultural 
frameworks around mental distress: witness Glaxo-Smith Klein’s intervention in the 1990s into 
Japanese perceptions of depression (Watters 2011). In the wake of this cultural manipulation, 
health insurance companies – more and more prominent within the neoliberalization of various 
health care systems - administer their claims through DSM categories. There is even worrying 
evidence of a strong correlation between the size of a health insurance claim and the likelihood 
of the pay-out diagnosis being given (Moloney 2013). Legal systems in various countries now 
base convictions and sentencing on ‘expert’ advice from criminal psychiatrists and 
psychologists whose authority rests upon their invocation of the DSM. Therapists of various 
persuasions know to utilize DSM vocabulary when called upon to write court reports, even 
when it does not inform their clinical work. And by locating itself at the centre of this web of 
productive global power, the DSM is a serious money-spinner: the American Psychiatric 
Association makes over $5 million a year from the sale of this ‘textbook’, totalling an estimated 
$100 million over the DSM’s sixty year existence (Angell 2011).  
 
A detailed genealogy of the emergence of the DSM is out of the question here, yet a quick 
sketch will show its ‘Foucaultian’ dimensions. It is inseparable from the rise of statistics as an 
instrument of governmentality, having its origins in census data from the 1880s when an 
attempt was made to measure levels of ‘idiocy’ in the American population (notably, many 
towns in the south automatically placed all their African-American residents under this 
heading). Just as stereotypically Foucaultian is the fact that the first DSM was explicitly based 
on a 1943 War Department technical bulletin entitled ‘Medical 203’, shifting the locus of the 
production of psychiatric knowledge from asylums and hospital settings to the US Army and 
its concern with the psychological robustness of soldiers. The DSM has since specialised in the 
exponential proliferation of new mental disorders. The first 1952 edition listed 106 disorders; 
the second in 1968 listed 182; and the massive revisions involved in the third edition of 1980 
led to no less than 265 disorders. This third edition explicitly abandoned Freudian 
psychopathology and the related categories of classical psychiatry, basing the etiology of 
mental disorders instead on the catch-all notion of ‘chemical imbalance’ (to which, of course, 
pills could best respond). The 1987 revision of DSM-III once again increased the number of 
disorders, this time to 292. The fourth edition published in 1994 listed almost triple the number 
identified in the first edition, at a whopping 297. The general upward trend has continued with 
most recent, and controversial, DSM-V, as has a very problematic tendency to dramatically 
reconfigure previous categories. Autism has ceased to be a ‘spectrum’ and ‘Asperger’s’ has 
disappeared completely, though, confusingly, those who have received that diagnosis are 
permitted to keep it (American Psychiatric Association 2013). Very much in keeping with 
Foucault’s later theorisation of biopolitics, the DSM can be seen as pivotal in placing a certain 
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understanding of health - at once affective and connected to economic productivity - at the 
centre of neoliberal modes of social control (Foucault 2010). 
 
So what might a Lacanian notion of discourse add to these Foucaultian insights into the DSM? 
Immediately, it encourages us to look beyond the technical vocabulary the DSM utilizes and 
even the institutional contexts that implement it, to focus on the structure of the social link it 
implies, and relatedly, at the relationship to knowledge and jouissance it maintains.  
 
As a diagnostic tool, the DSM inscribes a social link that fits perfectly into Lacan’s 
formalization of university discourse. We can take each of the four quadrants of its matheme 
in turn. Firstly, in the place of agency the DSM relies on a classificatory form of ‘neutral’ 
knowledge that kicks its machinery into motion prior to any medical professional’s speech: if 
a diagnosis has performative efficacy it is because of the preceding primacy of this ‘evidence-
based’ knowledge. Yet this supposedly ‘neutral’, self-reinforcing ‘evidence-base’ covertly 
relies on the incorporation of the DSM’s own epistemological limits into its very diagnostic 
logic, as indicated by notions such as ‘co-morbidity’ and various ‘not otherwise specified’ 
disorders (see Hacking 2013 for a critique of this problem) Secondly, in the place of truth, this 
neutral yet dominant knowledge, or S2, conceals its roots in a new S1, a now distributed form 
of statistical mastery linked to the uncoupling of expertise from individual experts (is this 
disembodying of clinical knowledge not one effect of ‘evidence-based medicine’, such that we 
now have Cognitive Behavioural Therapy that can be delivered entirely online?). Thirdly, as a 
discourse the DSM produces individuals marked by the label of a disorder which can often stay 
with them for a very long time, a lifetime in some cases. No longer the castrated neurotic of 
Freud’s era however, this is a subject ordered, as it were, by their disorder: DSM labels often 
support group-identities based on medicated subject positions, as with the role of Ritalin in 
Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder. Fourthly then, the DSM is paradigmatic of what 
Lacan calls ‘university discourse’ insofar as it puts objet a to work not as desire (metonymically 
passing along a signifying chain and given imaginary coherence by a fantasy framework), but 
rather, as an object of consumption produced by the market. Such objects plug directly into 
bodily jouissance without passing by way of the Other of language, often in the form of mood-
stabilising ‘happy pills’.  
 
This elevation of a real rather than a symbolic treatment of jouissance even suggests that the 
DSM is barely definable as a social link at all: the psychiatrist merely enacts the pre-given 
logic of the standardising system with little or no clinical judgement of their own entering in 
to the process. Speech in general is suppressed to the extent that DSM diagnoses are known to 
take a matter of minutes (Verhaeghe 2004). The ‘subject’ of this diagnosis, moreover, is 
effectively silenced as the object of a knowledge they do not possess: they become what 
Foucault presciently theorised as the neoliberal subject that simply responds, flexibly and 
without friction, to biopolitical forms of social control (Foucault 2010). Is this not also 
exemplary of the imbrication of capitalism and science which Lacan coins, in Seminar XVII, 
the ‘alethosphere’ (Lacan 2007,182)? With this term, Lacan was already describing an 
atmosphere or environment characterised by gadgets and instruments of consumption, 
developed by the market in order to stuff the mouths of subjects before they can articulate a 
desire that would be distinct from (supply and) demand. And does this machinic discourse of 
the DSM that simply ‘works’ - grinding subjects, psychiatrists as well as patients, up into its 
cogs – not imply that each individual is left alone with their own monetized jouissance-object, 
with no overarching Other through which to encounter even imaginary others, let alone the 
desire in their own speech? If Lacan always defined discourse as a social link, it may not be 
correct to refer to the discourse of the DSM, which seems to sever such links. 
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The Discourse of the Capitalist 
 
During a conference in Milan in May 1972 entitled Du Discours Psychanalytique, Lacan drew 
on the board the four discourses he had elaborated two years previously, but then added a fifth: 
the discourse of the capitalist. 
 
$  S2 
S1 a 
 
Lacan does not say much about this new matheme, and never makes use of it again to my 
knowledge. However, he does say two significant things – that it is “insanely clever” (follement 
astucieux) but that “it is bound to puncture” (voué à la crevaison) (Lacan 1972). Its diabolical 
cleverness is quickly apparent, for unlike the other discourses which are marked by a 
disjunctive impossibility, the orientation of the vectors here describes a figure eight, symbol of 
infinity, and thus an infernal circuit. There is also an inexplicable rupture with the combinatory 
logic of the other four discourses: this configuration cannot be derived even from the Master’s 
discourse which it most closely resembles. This is because Lacan has swapped the $ and the S1 
from the lower and upper registers respectively in the Master’s discourse, so that the divided 
subject here takes the place of truth and is animated by a new master signifier. What Lacan 
seems to have in mind is the idea that under capitalism the agent ($) addresses his lack to the 
S1 of the market, which then produces some knowledge (S2) that can respond to this lack, which 
in turn informs the production of an object (a) that satisfies the subject’s demand. In fact, there 
is no gap or excess in this circuit, because unlike the other discourses it is not organised around 
an impossibility: it seems to model a ‘consumer satisfaction’ without remainder, in so far as, 
rather like the drug Soma in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, everything is provided for, 
all needs are met, all wishes fulfilled. 
 
Why then is Lacan so blithely confident that “it is bound to puncture”? It can have nothing to 
do with a labour of the negative, for it is as if the capitalist Master has found a way to respond 
to the old Situationist slogan by making the impossible possible: castration is excluded from 
this circuit. Its propensity to deflate seems instead to have something to do with spinning too 
fast - an update it would seem, of the vicious circle Freud had already recognised in Civilization 
and its Discontents. Lacan says of the discourse of the capitalist that “it works like clockwork, 
but precisely it works too fast, it consumes itself, it is consumed so well it consumes 
itself/burns” (ça se consomme si bien que ça se consume) (Lacan 1972). In other words, the 
consumer of goods comes to be consumed by them. But it is precisely here, at this internal limit 
of capitalism borne of its reliance on desiring human bodies,that we find a suffering subject 
inextricably linked to clinical phenomena. Lacan’s late mathem of the discourse of the 
capitalist bespeaks a deflation or exhaustion that registers itself not in the overheated economic 
cycles of the markets per se, adepts as they are at turning crises into opportunities, but in the 
new symptoms that we see today of anxiety, addiction, depression and eating disorders.  
 
For this reason, if Lacanian psychoanalysis is to contribute to political theory and political 
practice, it will have to be not simply at the level of a theoretical speech amenable to university 
discourse, but as an analytic discourse which, against the dominant therapeutic culture 
constructed by the DSM, produces a singular social link between analyst and analysand by 
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